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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Larry M. Severson appeals from the judgment entered on the district
court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction
relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
"Larry Severson was convicted in 2004 of one count of first-degree
murder and one count of poisoning food or medicine. Those convictions were
upheld by the Court on direct appeal." Severson v. State, Docket No. 42830,
2015 Opinion No. 119, p.1 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2015) ("Opinion").

Following his

conviction, "Severson petitioned for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel on several grounds." (Opinion, p.2.) The district court
dismissed Severson's petition and the Idaho Supreme Court recently affirmed in
part and reversed in part. (Opinion, p.7.) With respect to the reversal, the Court
"vacate[d] the summary dismissal of Severson's claims for ineffective assistance
of counsel relating to the alleged improper statements [during closing argument]
that were not raised on direct appeal." (Opinion, p.7.) The Court determined
that, although it "could take it upon itself to decide" whether Severson raised a
genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on that
claim, "the better course of action is to remand for the district court to consider
this question." (Opinion, p.7.) Severson's original post-conviction action is still
pending.
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While his post-conviction appeal was pending, Severson filed a pro se
successive petition and a motion seeking leave

file a successive

pp.4-31.) Severson alleged four "causes of action" in his successive petition: (1)
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel for failing to "adequately review
the trial record or present an independent Confrontation Clause claim" in relation
to testimony from Dr. Glen Groben regarding the results of tests he did not
personally perform and testimony from Dr. Gary Dawson, and ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to "properly" object to Dr. Groben's and Dr.
Dawson's testimony; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to
"object to prosecutorial misconduct in voir dire, or seek a curative instruction due
to multiple instances of misconduct"; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for
failing to "move for a mistrial following an egregious occurrence of prosecutorial
misconduct" based on the prosecutor's "commentary" in response to an objection
made "during questioning of Special Agent Bourne," and ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel for "neglect[ing] to include the claim within the amended
petition"; and (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to "object to the
improper leading form of questions" asked of Teresa Bucholtz and Tracy Besler,
and failing to "object to admission of hearsay statements from th[ese] witness[es]
concerning the state of the Severson's marriage," as well as other hearsay
statements.

(R., pp.9-21 (capitalization altered).)

As to his fourth "cause of

action," Severson also asserted he did not "knowingly or intelligently waive this
claim nor [could he] recall being properly advised as to his rights involving these
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[ineffective assistance of trial counsel] claims when conferring with his court
appointed post-conviction counsel." (R., p.21.)
Severson also filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel. (R.,
pp.32-35.)

The state filed an answer and a separate motion for summary

dismissal.

(R., pp.41-49.)

The district court denied Severson's request for

counsel and issued a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.55-63.) Severson filed
a combined response to the state's motion and the court's notice after which the
court entered an order denying Severson's successive petition and a judgment
dismissing the petition. (R., pp.65-77.) Severson filed a motion to reconsider,
which the court also denied. (R., pp.79-90.) Severson filed a notice of appeal
timely only from the order denying his motion to reconsider. (R., pp.92-94.)
Although the district court denied Severson's motion for appointment of
counsel on appeal (R., p.97), it appears attorneys from the State Appellate
Public Defender ("SAPD") reviewed the merits of Severson's appeal and then
requested permission to withdraw after "three attorneys were unable to identify
any meritorious issues for appeal" (Motion for Leave to Withdraw and to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule; Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to
Withdraw and Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule). The Court granted the
SAPD's motion and Severson is proceeding pro se.
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ISSUES
Severson states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Severson's successive
petition for post-conviction relief where the petitioner did not
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive such claims?
2. Did the district court err in failing to apply the statutory "sufficient
reason" exemption, rather than the issue preclusion standard of
Murphy?
3. Did the district court err in failing to use the relation back
doctrine to provide Mr. Severson an opportunity to have his
claims presented in order to avoid violating due process?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Is this Court without jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the district
court's order summarily dismissing Severson's successive post-conviction
petition because Severson's appeal is not timely from that order?

2.

Has Severson failed to carry his burden of showing the district erred by
denying his motion for reconsideration?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Consider The Propriety Of The District
Court's Order Summarily Dismissing Severson's Successive Post-Conviction
Petition Because Severson's Appeal Is Not Timely From That Order
A.

Introduction
Severson argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

successive petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) This Court
is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Severson's appellate arguments
because Severson's appeal is not timely from the summary dismissal order.

B.

Standard Of Review
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)).

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free

review. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.

C.

This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Entertain Severson's Challenges To
The District Court's Order Summarily Dismissing His Successive PostConviction Petition
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed

within 42 days of the filing of the final judgment or order from which the appeal is

taken. In civil cases, the time for appeal may be tolled by "the filing of a timely
motion [except, inter alia, motions under I.R.C.P. 60] which, if granted could
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affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the action."

.AR 14(a). The time limits of I.AR 14(a) are jurisdictional. I

R 21. Where

an appellant has failed to timely appeal an order of the district court, this Court
does "not have jurisdiction to entertain a direct challenge to that order." State v.
Roberts, 126 Idaho 920, 922, 894 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct. App. 1995).
The district court entered its order summarily dismissing Severson's
successive post-conviction petition on July 7, 2014. (R., p.70.) Severson filed
his notice of appeal 78 days later, on September 23, 2014. (R., p.92.) Because
Severson did not file his notice of appeal within 42 days of the order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction, his appeal is not timely from that order.
Severson did file a motion for reconsideration on July 23, 2014 (R., p.79)
- 16 days after the court entered its order summarily dismissing the postconviction petition; but that motion did not toll the 42-day period in which
Severson was required to file a notice of appeal from the order of summary
dismissal. Although Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides that "the time for an
appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated by the filing of
a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of
law or any judgment in the action," the rule "except[s] motions under Rule 60 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Severson cited I.R.C.P. 11 (2)(B) as a basis
for his motion to reconsider and relied on a Ninth Circuit case, which in turn
discussed motions to reconsider under F.R.C.P. 59(e). (R., p.80 (citing Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2011)).) However, I.R.C.P. 11 (2)(8)
governs motions to reconsider interlocutory orders and motions to reconsider
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order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment." The cou
summary dismissal order is neither an interlocutory order nor an order after entry
of judgment. Thus, I. R. C. P. 11 (2)(B) does not apply to Severson's request for
reconsideration. Severson's reliance on F.R.C.P. 59 is also misplaced because
it is a federal rule that governs federal proceedings, not state court actions.
Severson's motion to reconsider also cannot be construed as one under I.R.C.P.
59 because the basis for Severson's motion does not fall within any of the
reasons for reconsideration authorized by that rule. See I.R.C.P. 59(a). Even if
Severson's motion could be considered a Rule 59 motion, the motion was not
filed within 14 days, as required by I.R.C.P. 59(e), and only a timely motion
terminates the period for filing an appeal. 1 The only basis for Severson's motion
to reconsider is I.R.C.P. 60(b), but that rule does not terminate the time for filing
an appeal. As such, Severson's appeal is only timely from the order denying his
motion to reconsider. (Compare R., p.89 (Order Denying Reconsideration, filed
August 25, 2014) with p.92 (Notice of Appeal, filed September 23, 2014).)

Severson acknowledges the 14-day filing requirement in his motion to
reconsider, and references the "mailbox rule." (R., p.80.) Under the mailbox
rule, pleadings filed by pro se inmates are deemed filed at the time of delivery to
prison authorities, rather than when received by the court clerk. Munson v.
State, 128 Idaho 639, 642, 917 P.2d 796, 799 (1996). Severson signed his
motion to reconsider on July 21, 2014 (R., p.83), the 14th day after the court
entered judgment (R., p. 77). Ordinarily, however, a pro se inmate claiming
application of the mailbox rule must present evidence - generally in the form of
prison mail logs - demonstrating the timeliness of the filing pursuant to that rule.
See, ~ . State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 204-205, 786 P.2d 594, 595-596 (Ct.
App. 1990); Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 91, 137 P.3d 475, 478 (Ct. App.
2006). No such evidence is included in the record in this case and, in any event,
for the reasons already stated, Severson's motion should not be considered a
Rule 59 motion.
1
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Severson did not file
of

summary

dismissal,

of

and

because

his

untimely

motion

reconsideration did not toll the time for filing the notice of appeal, Severson's
appeal is not timely from the order of summary dismissal. This Court therefore
does "not have jurisdiction to entertain [Severson's] direct challenge to that
order." Roberts, 126 Idaho at 922, 894 P.2d at 155 (Ct. App. 1995).

11.
Severson Has Failed To Argue, Much Less Demonstrate, That The District Court
Erred In Denying His Motion For Reconsideration And Has Failed To
Demonstrate Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Successive PostConviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Because Severson's appeal is timely only from the district court's order

denying his motion for reconsideration, that is the only order this Court has
jurisdiction to review.

See Section I.C., supra.

Severson, however, does not

directly challenge the court's order denying his motion for reconsideration.
Instead, Severson's arguments focus on the alleged error in the district court's
summary dismissal order.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Because Severson has

not even argued, much less demonstrated, that the district court erred in denying
his motion for reconsideration, the order of the district court must be affirmed.
State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) (appellate court
will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been assigned
and will not otherwise search the record for unspecified errors).
Alternatively, the order of the district court should be affirmed on its
merits.

The district court summarily dismissed Severson's successive post-
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because

failed to show a

against successive petitions.

reason

, pp.74-75.) The

overcome
also found

that Severson's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were untimely.
(R., p.75.) Severson contends "the district court erred in denying his filing of the
verified successive petition for post-conviction relief because [he] did not
knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently waive such claims." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
Severson also argues the district court "failed to assess the sufficient and
compelling reasons ... permitting him to raise issues in a successive petition."
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

Finally, Severson asserts the district court erred by

failing to apply the "relation back doctrine."

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

All of

Severson's arguments lack merit. Application of the correct legal standards to
the facts of this case shows the district court did not err in summarily dismissing
Severson's successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908 or in determining that
Severson's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were untimely.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
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Severson Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's Order
Denying Reconsideration
Severson's claims on appeal relate

the district

summary

dismissal order rather than any complaints particular to the court's order denying
reconsideration.

(See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Indeed, Severson's

request for reconsideration was based on the same arguments he made in his
combined response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss and the state's
motion for summary dismissal (compare R., pp.65-68 with R., pp.79-83), and the
district court's order denying Severson's motion to reconsider reflects as much in
that the court notes nothing in Severson's memorandum "cause[d] the court to
reach a different conclusion" (R., p.90). Because Severson's claims on appeal
directly challenge the district court's summary dismissal order and not any
unique error in the district court's order denying reconsideration, and because
the order denying reconsideration is the only action properly reviewed on appeal,
this Court should affirm. Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 159, 657 P.2d at 23.

D.

Alternatively, Severson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary
Dismissal Of His Successive Petition
To the extent this Court considers Severson's complaints about the district

court's summary dismissal order, Severson's claims fail. Idaho Code § 19-4908
states:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act
must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended
application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that
resu!ted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding
the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief
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asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application.
The district court correctly dismissed Severson's successive petition
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908 because Severson failed to articulate a sufficient
reason that would allow him to proceed.

The "sufficient reason" Severson

offered in district court was his allegation that· post-conviction counsel was
ineffective. (R., pp.66-67.) As noted by the district court (R., p.74), this is no
longer a viable sufficient reason in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), in which the Court held
that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason for
purposes of I.C. § 19-4908.

Moreover, contrary to Severson's assertion on

appeal (Appellant's Brief, p. 7), post-conviction counsel was not deficient for
failing to search the trial record for additional claims for Severson to add to his
petition because post-conviction counsel has no obligation to do so.

See

Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369 (quotations and citation omitted)
("Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to
search the record for possible nonfrivolous claims, counsel should be appointed
if the facts alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim."). Severson has failed to
articulate any legal basis for reversing the district court's determination that the
alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient
reason allowing the pursuit of a successive petition.
Severson also appears to challenge the district court's determination that
his ineffective of trial counsel claims are untimely.
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In particular, Severson

contends he did not know these claims were "omitted" from

amended petition

until "his appellate counsel in those proceedings" brought it to his attention, and
asserts the "relation back doctrine" should apply. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6, 8-9.)
Based on his complaints about post-conviction counsel, Severson's use of the
word "omitted" presumably relates to post-conviction counsel's failure to add the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to Severson's initial petition.
However, for purposes of determining whether the claims were timely, the
relevant inquiry is when the claims were known. The Idaho Supreme Court has
"repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims can or should be
known after trial." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,253,220 P.3d 1066, 1072
(2009). Accordingly, such claims should have been raised in a post-conviction
petition "within one (1) year form the expiration of the time for appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 194902(a). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Severson's convictions on May 29,
2009, and denied rehearing on August 24, 2009. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009).

The ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims

Severson alleged in his successive petition, filed May 9, 2014 (R., p.4), were well
beyond the statutory limitation period and the district court properly concluded
the claims are untimely.
Severson's reliance on the relation back doctrine, apparently for the
purpose of having his claims considered timely, is misplaced.

The Court of

Appeals applied the relation back doctrine in the context of a post-conviction
case in Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999). In
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that case,
successive

applied the doctrine to allow the petitioner
litigate claims that were inadequately raised in

petition because post-conviction counsel was ineffective.

kl

file a
in

In doing so, the

Court relied on Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981), which
the Supreme Court expressly overruled in Murphy, supra. Hernandez, 133 Idaho
at 798, 992 P.2d at 793. Thus, Severson's assertion that he can take advantage
of the relation back doctrine because he believes post-conviction counsel was
ineffective fails.
Because Severson has failed to show error in the dismissal of his
successive post-conviction petition, he is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Severson's successive petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 29th day of December, 2015.
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